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University of Colorado at Boulder!
!
This paper was a contribution to an invited symposium on Truthmakers at the annual 
meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division),!
New Orleans, February 23, 2013.!
!
Abstract!
The core of the truthmaker research program is that true propositions are made true by 
appropriate parts of the actual world.  This idea seems to give realists their best shot at 
capturing a robust account of the dependence of truth on the world.   For a part of the 
world to be a truthmaker for a particular it must suffice for, or necessitate, the truth of 
the proposition.  There are two extreme and unsatisfactory truthmaker theories.  At one 
extreme any part of the world (up to and including the whole world) that suffices for a 
proposition is deemed to be a truthmaker for that proposition.  At the other extreme 
there is only one truthmaker that can do the job, and that is the entire world, the whole 
show.  Another possibility suggests itself, that a truthmaker be any minimal sufficer for a 
proposition.  A truthmaker is minimal if it suffices but no proper part of it suffices.  A 
minimal sufficer would be both sufficient for the truth of the proposition and, in one 
sense, necessary for it as well.  A minimal sufficers would be commensurate with the 
proposition it makes true.  Unfortunately not all propositions have minimal sufficers. But 
it does not follow that not every proposition has a commensurate sufficer.  The problem, 
then, is to specify a coherent notion of commensurateness on which every truth has a 
commensurate sufficer. I argue that this problem may not be soluble. 
An argument against commensurate truthmakers!
!
The core of the truthmaker research program is that true propositions are made true by 
appropriate parts of the actual world.  I have three confessions to make. First: I am (or 
used to be) a bit of a fan of the program.  It seems to give realists their best shot at 
capturing a robust account of the dependence of truth on the world.   Second: I have 
(somewhat to my own dismay) stumbled on what appears to be a new problem for 
truthmaker theory.  The core desiderata of the program cannot be jointly satisfied.  
Third: I hope I am wrong, and that someone can locate an error in the proof.!
1! Truthmakers as parts of worlds!
I will assume that the World is the fusion of facts not things. (If you want a term for the 
fusion of things, not facts, call it the Universe.)  And I will assume that it is parts of the 
World (i.e. facts) that make propositions true, not parts of the Universe (i.e. particular 
things). !
! Let’s start with an easy and favorable case for truthmaker theory. Consider some 
particular object x (some particular leaf, say) and the proposition (G) that x is green.  
Suppose G is true.  Which part of the world makes this proposition true?  This isn’t one 
of the problem cases faced by truthmaker theorists — like a negative proposition, a 
universal proposition, a negative existential, a proposition about the future, and so on — 
and there are seemingly good candidates on offer. One such is the fact that consists in 
x’s being green. The particular x alone does not make the proposition true, and neither 
does the property of being green.  It is the having by x of the property of greenness that 
makes G true, and that is a fact.!
! So I am going to assume, without further argument, that the truthmakers of 
propositions are facts and that facts are obtaining states or events (from now on I will 
refer to them as states). Basic states consist in the having, by objects, of genuine 
properties, or the standing in genuine relations of objects. But basic states can be parts 
both of other basic states and of non-basic states, which are also candidates for the role 
of truthmakers of propositions.!
! I will make a few assumptions about the structure of the space of states.  First, 
states can be parts of other states. (For example, all actual states are parts of the actual 
world). And states can determine other states.  (The actual world as a whole determines 
all actual states.)  But these relations are the converse of each other.  The parthood 
relation (⊑) is just the converse of the determination relation (⊒).  A state t determines a 
state s (t⊒s) if and only if s is a part of t (s⊑t). Proper parthood and strict determination 
are the obvious restrictions of these relations to distinct states. !
! For suitable classes of possible states (those which are, intuitively, compatible) 
there is the unique state which is the fusion of those states. The fusion of some class of 
compatible states is the smallest state (in the ordering by parts) of which all the states in 
the class are parts (i.e. it is the least upper bound or supremum of the class of states).  
Where S is a class of compatible states, the fusion of S will be written ⊕S.  And the 
supremum of a pair of compatible states s and t will be written s⊕t.   We can define a 1
world as a maximal state.  A state s obtains in a world w just in case s is a part of w 2
(s⊑w). !3
! For our purposes here we can remain fairly neutral about the nature and 
structure of propositions. All I will assume is that proposition induce a bifurcation of the 
 The notion of compatibility of states can be spelt out in a number of different ways.  One uses the notion 1
of a directed set.  A directed set is a set in which any two members of the set have an upper bound in the 
set (i.e. any two members of the set are parts of a third member of the set).  A set’s being directed is a 
sufficient condition for the compatibility of the states in the set.  A partially ordered set is directed com-
plete (it is a dcpo) if every directed subset has a least upper bound, or supremum.  The supremum of a 
directed set of states (the fusion of the set) is that state which takes place if and only if every state in the 
set takes place. Alternatively one could regard any set of states that has an upper bound in the ordering 
to be compatible, and require that each bounded set has a least upper bound in the ordering.
 The existence of worlds in a dcpo is guaranteed by the fact that every chain must have a supremum. A 2
chain is a set of states in which for any two distinct members of the set, s and t, either s is a proper part of 
t or tis a proper part of s.  A chain is clearly a directed set (the larger of any two members of the set is an 
upper bound for the pair) and so in a dcpo, every chain has a supremum, the fusion of all the states in the 
chain.  
 For simplicity I am just going to ignore the temporal dimension, which presents its own significant diffi3 -
culties for truthmaker theory.  This simplification might not be a problem for a four-dimensionalist who 
could treat the having of properties as a relation between things and times.  But it might be thought prob-
lematic for a three-dimensionalist.  However, in the context of  my impossibility proof, the simplification is 
harmless. For if we cannot find parts of the world fit for the truthmaking role in this simplified atemporal 
framework we are not going to find them in a full blown temporal framework in which the flow of time is 
real.
set of worlds — the worlds in which the proposition is true and those in which it is false.   4
But this is of course compatible with propositions being structured, fine-grained entities. 
There can be many distinct propositions that induce the very same partition of worlds.  !
! If every world in which a state s occurs is a world in which the proposition P is 
true, then s is a sufficer for P.  Most truthmaker theorists accept that any candidate 
truthmaker for P must be a sufficer for P. The obtaining of s necessitates the truth of P.  
Call this principle: !
! Necessitation!
All potential truthmakers for a proposition are sufficers for the proposition (and all 
the actual truthmakers for a true proposition are actual sufficers).  !
In the case of G, for example, there are tons of actual sufficers. There is the state, g, 
that consists in x’s having the property of being green (assuming, for the moment, that 
being green is a genuine property ).  But any actual state of which g is a proper part is 5
also an actual sufficer.  For example, the complete distribution of hue, saturation and 
brightness over the entire surface of the leaf;  the fusion of all color states (i.e. the 
complete actual distribution of hue, saturation and brightness over all objects);  the 
complete actual distribution of all fully determinate properties and relations over over all 
the objects in the actual world (i.e. the whole show, the big enchilada, all that’s the case, 
the fusion of all actual states, the World).  All these are actual sufficers for the 
proposition G. !
! In light of this surfeit of actual sufficers there are three basic choices for a 
truthmaker theorist.  First, she could go all inclusive by deeming all sufficers of a 
proposition to be potential truthmakers. !
! All-Inclusive  !
All actual sufficers of a proposition are truthmakers for the proposition. !
 Again for reasons of simplicity, I will ignore the interesting plight of truthvalueless propositions in a theory 4
of truthmakers.
 I take genuine properties to be the convex regions of a quality space.  See Peter Gärdenfors, Concep5 -
tual Spaces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), and Graham Oddie Value, Reality and Desire (Oxford: 
OUP, 2005) chapter 5.  
Necessitation and All-Inclusive jointly entail a complete theory of truthmakers:!
 A State is a truthmaker for P true if and only if it is an actual sufficer for P.!
All Inclusive embraces a vast and varied array of states as the truthmakers for G, from 
least (x’s being green), to largest (the actual world).   !
! But one could also go selective: narrowing down the set of truthmakers to some 
small and privileged set of actual sufficers.   !
! Consider the actual world — the fusion of all actual states. One and only one 
world is actual.  The actual world not only suffices for the truth of G, but for every other 
truth as well.   As Armstrong puts it (rather moralistically), the actual world is “the most 6
promiscuous” and “least discerning truthmaker of them all” — at least given the 
assumption, to which Armstrong is sympathetic, that the actual world not only suffices 
for every truth, but makes true every truth.  Other potential truthmakers are less 
promiscuous, or more discerning, about the range of propositions they make true.  !
! The world is a candidate truthmaker for a theorist who also wants to go selective.  
One could deem the actual world the sole truthmaker for all truths.    Indeed it seem that 7
this is the paradigm for a selective theory that embraces undiscerning truthmakers. 
Deeming the actual world the sole truthmaker of all truths is selective, but by its very 
universality, the actual world is the least discerning actual sufficer on offer.  !
 ! Selective and Undiscerning!
! There is one and only one truthmaker for all truths:  the actual world.!
! Return to the little proposition G.  Of all the actual sufficers for G, the most 
discerning in our hierarchy is the state g: x’s being green. It suffices for the truth of the 
proposition G (any sufficer for G must contain	  g as a proper part) but g does so without 
any extra, unnecessary, otiose, or irrelevant bits of the world. g	   is a discerning because 
 There are of course, problems lurking here, most obviously with the negative existentials. I will ignore 6
these here because I think there are various ways a truthmaker theorist can make the World sufficiently 
rich to solve them.  I have assumed that the set of states is directed complete, which entails the existence 
of maximal elements (i.e. worlds) which are not part of any larger states. There are no upward chains 
which go on forever, never culminating in a world, and every state is part of at least one world.
 See Jonathan Schaffer, “The most promiscuous and least discerning truthmaker”, The Philosophical 7
Quarterly Vol. 60, No. 239.
it doesn’t make any propositions that are logically stronger than G true, and — 
depending on how one goes on to develop the theory — there may also be propositions 
strictly weaker than G that g does not make true either. To go discerning, then, is to 
narrow the set of candidate truthmakers to actual sufficers that accomplish making-true 
as economically as possible.  They are large enough (they suffice) but they are not too 
large (they don’t go over the top).  Because of this, a discerning truthmaker will make 
true a relatively small set of propositions, those for which it is (as I will say) 
commensurate. This intuitive notion of commensurateness — which it is the purpose of 
this paper to develop and explore — gives us the basic framework for any Selective and 
Discerning account:!
! Selective and Discerning!
! A state s  is a truthmaker for a proposition P if and only if s is a commensurate 
actual sufficer for P.!
2! Commensurate sufficers!
In first introducing us to his conception of truthmakers in his 2004 book Truth and 
Truthmakers David Armstrong says this:!
The idea of a truthmaker for a particular truth, then, is just some existent, some 
portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true. ...There is something that 
exists, in reality, .... which makes the truth true. .. This ‘making’ is of course, not 
the causal sense of ‘making’. The best formulation of what this making is seems 
to be given by the phrase ‘in virtue of’.  !8
Although Armstrong here rightly distances truthmaking from causal making, the two 
cases share a striking feature.  The requirement that a proposition be true in virtue of its 
truthmaker sounds similar to what Yablo has dubbed the commensurateness of cause 
to effect, which in turn draws on the traditional idea that the cause of a state must not 
only be sufficient for its effect but also (in some sense) necessary.   Recall that, 9
 Armstrong, D. M. Truth and and Truthmakers, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p. 5.8
 Stephen Yablo, “Mental Causation”, Philosophical Review, (1992), 101: 145-809
according to Yablo, not all the states that are causally sufficient for some state are 
equally good candidates for the cause of the state. The cause of a state must be 
commensurate with its effect, in the sense that while it must be determinate enough to 
causally suffice, it should not be more determinate than it is necessary for it to be. In 
what follows I argue that the idea behind discerning truthmakers is simply that they must 
be commensurate with the propositions they make true. Neither too large nor too small.  !
! If the proposition G is true in virtue of any obtaining state it is true in virtue of x’s 
instantiating greenness: the state g. But consider the proposition R that some object y, 
distinct from x, is red. The proposition R is not true in virtue of g, because g fails to be an 
actual sufficer for it (it isn’t enough).  But even the weaker proposition [R∨¬R] doesn’t 
seem to be true in virtue of g, because g just carries too much excess baggage for that 
(it is too large).  Even though it is an actual sufficer for [R∨¬R], g	  isn’t commensurate 
with [R∨¬R].  It carries baggage that is strictly unnecessary for the truth of [R∨¬R].  !
! Likewise, actual states that are more determinate than g (of which g must be a 
proper part) also suffice for G, but G is not true in virtue of them either, since they too 
carry excess baggage, baggage that doesn’t do any work in making G true. 
Truthmakers, and parts of truthmakers, have to earn their keep by doing some work! 
Even though G is true in virtue of g, and g is a proper part of many actual states, 
including the actual world w, G is not true in virtue of these larger states. Like these 
more encompassing bits of reality, g is large enough to do the job of making G true, but 
unlike them, it isn’t too large.  It is, as Goldilocks, might say, “just right”. !
! All Inclusive yields the problematic Entailment Principle: that if s is a truthmaker 
for P then s is a truthmaker for every logical consequence of P. Suppose that state g is a 
truthmaker for proposition G.  Then, since G entails both [R∨¬R] and [7+5=12], g is also 
a truthmaker for [R∨¬R] and [7+5=12], along with any other necessarily true proposition. g is a truthmaker for all of them, as is every other actual state. This truthmaker 
trivialization result — that a truthmaker for any proposition is also a truthmaker for every 
necessary proposition — clearly violates the requirement that propositions be true in 
virtue of their truthmakers.  The proposition that [7+5=12] is not true in virtue of x’s being 
green.!
! Some of those sympathetic to truthmakers who find this trivialization result 
unpalatable have suggested restricting the truthmaker requirement to contingent truths 
alone. Frank Jackson suggested this once.  And Hugh Mellor has argued, quite 10
generally, that since necessary truths are true come what may, nothing is required to 
make them true.  In particular, x’s being green doesn’t make them true.  !11
! While this move is not totally unmotivated it is not an entirely happy one.  Firstly it 
involves abandoning unrestricted Truthmaker Maximalism — the thesis that all truths 
have truthmakers. But perhaps the requirement for truthmakers can be reasonably 
restricted to contingent truths.  Secondly, and more importantly, even if it does block a 
class of counterexamples to the Entailment Principle, it doesn’t tackle the underlying 
problem. While the problem surfaces in a particularly stark form at the limit — in 
truthmakers for necessary truths — it is ubiquitous.  At bottom it is the problem of 
commensurateness.  Just as g is not commensurate with necessarily true propositions, 
the vast array of more encompassing states of which g is a part are not commensurate 
with the small and modest, but contingent, proposition G.!
! David Armstrong makes extensive use of the Entailment Principle throughout his 
work on truthmakers. He claims the principle helps identify truthmakers for propositions 
that otherwise look like they might have none  — for example, truths about mere 
possibilities (e.g. that G is contingent). But, as we have seen, the Entailment Principle 
violates Armstrong’s own in-virtue-of requirement, deeming states truthmakers that are 
clearly incommensurate with the propositions they are supposed to make true. To avoid 
absurd consequences like the trivialization thesis, Armstrong proposes to restrict it to 
relevant entailments:  if s makes P true, and P relevantly entails Q, then s also makes Q 
true. So, for example, g makes G true: and since G relevantly entails the necessary 
truth G∨¬G,	  g  also makes the necessary truth [G∨¬G] one true.  However, G doesn’t 
relevantly entail the necessary truth [R∨¬R], so a Relevant Entailment Principle would 
 Greg Restall reports this in his “Truthmakers, entailment and necessity”, Australasian Journal of Philos10 -
ophy 74,  (1996) p. 334, and calls it “Jackson’s thesis”. 
  See Hugh Mellor “Contingent Facts” Analysis 71:1 (2011), pp. 62-68.  Mellor further restricts to the the11 -
sis to what he calls “primary truths” which are presumably true “atomic” propositions, or something like 
that.
block at least some of the counterintuitive consequences of a pure Entailment Principle. 
Armstrong outsources to Relevance logicians the task of articulating a suitable theory of 
relevant entailment that will mesh with his other desiderata on truthmaking. !
! Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, also a truthmaker enthusiast, makes a similar 
objection the Conjunction Principle (viz. that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a 
truthmaker for each of its conjuncts).   He disposes of this Principle with the following 12
example:!
Take an arbitrary conjunction, say <Peter is a man and Saturn is a planet>. !
Suppose that conjunctions are made true by conjunctive entities and that this 
conjunction is made true by the conjunctive fact that Peter is a man and Saturn is 
a planet. Even so it is not the case that <Peter is a man> is true in virtue of the 
fact that Peter is a man and Saturn is a planet. What <Peter is a man> is true in 
virtue of is simply the fact that Peter is man.! !
Again, the underlying idea is that the fusion of Peter’s being a man and Saturn’s being a 
planet is not a suitable truthmaker for the proposition that Peter is a man, because it 
contains excess baggage.  The proposition is true in virtue of the less determinate state, 
and any more determinate state of which it is a part fails to be commensurate. ! The 
Entailment Principle, whether unrestricted or restricted to relevant entailments, also 
yields the result that the World is a truthmaker for every truth.  Suppose there is a 
maximally strong proposition, Truthw, that is true in just the one world, w. Suppose 
further, that Truthw is true in fact, that w	  is the actual world. Then w,	  the World, suffices 
for Truthw, and no part of w	  suffices. So w is perfectly commensurate with Truthw.  Let P 
be any true proposition.  Since Truthw entails P, by the unrestricted Entailment Principle, w is a truthmaker for P.  But w is hardly commensurate with the content of a proposition 
like G (that X is green). Suppose that r is the rest of the World — w minus just that one 
tiny little state g. The World is thus the fusion of g and r (w = g⊕r).  While the 
 The Entailment Principle clearly entails the Conjunction Principle.  The Conjunction Principle together 12
with the Equivalence Principle (that logical equivalents have the same truthmakers) entails the Entailment 
Principle. Assume Conjunction and Equivalence.  Suppose P entails Q and s is a truthmaker for P. Then 
since P is equivalent to P&Q, by Equivalence s is a truthmaker for P&Q, and by the Conjunction Principle, 
s is a truthmaker for Q.  This demonstration, of course, ignores the kinds of strictures hat could be im-
posed by some criteria of relevance.
proposition G is clearly true in virtue of the obtaining of g, it doesn’t seem true in virtue 
of f r. So r is not only irrelevant to the truth of the proposition G, it is vastly so.  But then, 
almost all of the World is completely irrelevant to the truth of G (Remember: g	  is but a 
tiny part of	  g⊕r while r is most of it). Just as  the proposition that Peter is a man is not 
true in virtue of Saturn’s being a planet and Peter’s being a man, G is not true in virtue 
of the fusion of g and (the vastly irrelevant) r.!
! A relevantist might well object that even though Truthw	  classically entails all 
truths, it may not relevantly entail all truths.  But this is not enough to block trivialization. 
Where P is a truth not relevantly entailed by Truthw, consider the proposition Truthw∧P.  w is the only good candidate for truthmaker of Truthw∧P, since w is the only state that 
suffices for it.  And Truthw∧P does relevantly entail P.  So, by the Relevant Entailment 
Principle, w is a truthmaker for P too.!
! All Inclusive and Selective and Undiscerning are thus both in conflict with the 
desideratum that a truthmaker be commensurate with any proposition it makes true.!
From now on I will assume that the condition of commensurateness is a basic 
desideratum for an adequate theory of truthmakers, that a truthmaker theorist wants a  
Selective and Discerning account.!
3! Minimal sufficers!
Armstrong is sensitive to the requirement of commensurateness which his in-virtue-of 
requirement imposes.  Although he still seems to endorse the World as a universal 
truthmaker, as we have already noted he also rightly disparages it as “the most 
promiscuous” and “least discerning truthmaker of them all”.  He goes on:!
More interesting, and of quite special importance for metaphysics, is the notion of 
a minimal truthmaker.  If s is a minimal truthmaker for P then you cannot subtract 
anything from s and the remainder still be a truthmaker for P.   !13
He goes on to suggest that minimal truthmakers might be the only decent candidates for 
the status of truthmaker:!
 Armstrong, D. M. Truth and and Truthmakers, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p. 19.13
One may object to the idea that there are any truthmakers except minimal 
truthmakers.  For it, may be argued, a non-minimal truthmaker involves 
redundancy, and the truth in question may not be true in virtue of the redundant 
material. ... If someone wishes to say that what I call a non-minimal truthmaker 
for a certain proposition is really a portion of reality that has the real truthmaker 
as a proper art, then I have no metaphysical objection. !14
! The attraction of minimal actual sufficers is precisely that they satisfy the 
requirement of commensurateness.  They are large enough (they suffice) but are not 
too large (no proper part of a minimal sufficer would be large enough).  Whether or not 
all commensurate sufficers are minimal sufficers, it is pretty clear that all minimal 
sufficers of a proposition are commensurate.!
! Consider either it is hot or dry [H∨D]. Suppose H and D are both true.  Its being 
hot (h) is a minimal sufficer for H, and its being dry (d) is a minimal sufficer for D. No 
proper part of h or of d suffices for [H∨D], so both are minimal actual sufficers for [H∨D]. 
The state	  its being still (s) is not a truthmaker for [H∨D] — it contains both too little (it 
doesn’t suffice), and too much (its being still does no truthmaking work here).  The 
fusion of its being hot and its being still (i.e. h⊕s) also suffices, but it too contains too 
much (the stillness factor), so it also fails to be a commensurate truthmaker for [H∨D]. 
Arguably h⊕d	  (like	  h⊕s) also contains too much. These facts are compatible with, and 
indeed suggest, Armstrong’s tentative proposal that to be commensurate with P a state 
must be a minimal sufficer for P. !
! Call this notion minimal commensurateness, or m-commensurate for short.  !
A state s  is m-commensurate with a proposition P if and only s suffices for P and 
the only part of s that suffices for P is s itself.!
We can put the defining condition in the following form which will prove useful later on:!
! s suffices for P and for any r⊑s that suffices for P, r=s.!
 Armstrong, D. M. Truth and and Truthmakers, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p. 20-1.14
Unfortunately, this is rendered problematic by an unfortunate logical fact: that there are 
certain contingent propositions that do not, and cannot, have any minimal sufficer.   So 15
if we explicate the key notion using m-commensurateness then the Selective and 
Discerning theorist has to give up the idea that all truths have truthmakers.  !
4! Not all propositions have minimal sufficers!
Suppose there are denumerably many electrons, and consider the proposition:  !
D: ! There are denumerably many electrons.!
Let e1, e2, e3, ... be an enumeration of all basic electron states (i.e. en is the state that 
consists in the particular Xn being an electron).   Where E0 = {e1, e2, e3, ...}  the state ⊕E0 
clearly suffices for D. Is it a minimal sufficer?  Consider ⊕E1, where E1 = E0	  — {e1}.   
Clearly, ⊕E1 also suffices for D, and ⊕E1 is a proper part of E0. So ⊕E0 isn’t a minimal 
sufficer for D. We can repeat this argument to show that there can be no minimal 
sufficer for D. If d suffices for D then d must have as parts infinitely many basic electron 
states. Let d-­‐  be that proper part of d that excludes the first electron state in d in the 
above enumeration of electron states.  Then d-­‐⊑d  suffices for D, and d-­‐≠d.!
! Restall’s argument doesn’t directly refute the thesis that all truths have 
commensurate sufficers: what it does show is that not all commensurate sufficers need 
be minimal sufficers.  Any state which is large enough to make D true will have to 
contain infinitely many electron state parts. The question is which of these states are too 
large to be commensurate with D.  Here is an argument that the fusion of any 
denumerable subset of the electron states is commensurate with D. 	  	   Let Eo = E, and En+1 = En — {en}, and consider the descending chain of states:!
⊕E0 ⊐ ⊕E1 ⊐ ⊕E2 ⊐ ...  ⊕En ⊐ ⊕En+1 ⊐ ...!
All the states in this sequence are large enough for D (all suffice).  In general we will 
make use of the following connection between parthood and commensurateness:!
 Armstrong attributes the following argument (or something in the ballpark) to Greg Restall, but does not 15
cite a paper.  In an email exchange Restall confirmed that he made the point in a conversation with Arm-
strong, not in print.
If state s is a part of t and t is not too large to be commensurate with D then 
neither is s.  !
So, if ⊕En  is commensurate with D, then ⊕En+1 is too, since the latter suffices for D, and 
is a proper part of En.  It follows that: (i) if any element in the sequence is commensurate 
with D all its successors in the sequence are. Suppose for some n  that ⊕En+1 is 
commensurate with D.  Then ⊕En+1 is not too large for D.  But the difference between !En+1 = {en+1, en+2, e3n+, ...}  and En = {en, en+1, en+2, ...} is only the presence of the one 
electron state, en , and it is absurd to suppose that that particular state could make the 
difference between being too large for D and being commensurate with D.   Hence it 
follows that: (ii) if some state ⊕En+1 in the sequence is commensurate with D, every state 
before ⊕En+1 in the sequence (i.e. ⊕E0 to ⊕En-1) is also commensurate with D. From (i) 
and (ii) we have that either:!
(A) No member of the sequence is commensurate with D; !
(B) Every member of the sequence is commensurate with D. !
Now, we could repeat the argument for any enumeration of Eo demonstrating that:!
(A) No part of ⊕Eo  is commensurate with D — all parts are either too large or 
too small;!
(B) Non-denumerably many parts of ⊕Eo are commensurate with D — i.e. the 
fusion of any denumerable subset of Eo is commensurate with D. !
If we accept (A) then (assuming commensurateness) we would have to give up on the 
truthmaker program.    !
! But we don’t have to accept (A), at least not yet.  Since any sufficer for D has to 
contain a denumerable number of basic electron states, any such state (provided it 
doesn’t contain anything otiose) should be deemed just right for D. If this is so, rather 
than showing that D has no commensurate sufficers Restall’s argument shows that 
there are many commensurate sufficers for D. Indeed, there are non-denumerably 
many, even though none are minimal.!
! But now we face an explosion problem.  On pain of ending up jettisoning the 
commensurateness requirement and going All Inclusive, we have to limit the class of 
commensurate states from above in some principled way. !
5! Structurally minimal sufficers!
What would count, then, as a clear example of an incommensurate sufficer for D?   The 
World as a whole, of course, but what are there any less encompassing states? And 
where do we draw the line?  !
! Suppose that there are denumerably infinitely many basic electron states E and 
denumerably infinitely many basic proton states P as well.  Consider the union of these 
two sets:  E∪P.  ⊕E∪P	  is an actual sufficer for D.  But, while ⊕E∪P is certainly large 
enough for D it goes way over the top. Given that all the proton states in ⊕E∪P	  are 
irrelevant to the truth of D, ⊕E∪P contains far too much excess baggage to be 
commensurate with D.  But in what salient way does ⊕E∪P differ from ⊕E, other than 
the obvious fact that ⊕E	  is a proper part of ⊕E∪P?!
! There is an obvious difference between proper parts of ⊕E and proper parts of 
⊕E∪P.  All the proper parts of ⊕E that suffice for D have the same structure as ⊕E itself.  
States s and f have the same structure if and only if they determine the same overall 
distribution of properties and relations, albeit over possibly different individuals.   The 16
fusion of any infinite subset of E thus has the same structure (in this sense) as ⊕E itself.  
For the same reason, any proper part of ⊕E that suffices for D has the same structure 
as ⊕E. And what seems important here is that the structure of ⊕E is minimal for 
ensuring the truth of D.  Any state that suffices for D will have a part that has the 
structure of ⊕E, and any proper substructure of ⊕E will be too small to ensure the truth 
of D.  By contrast, there are many parts of ⊕E∪P that suffice for D that have a smaller 
structure than the structure of ⊕E∪P.  And some have a much smaller structure. But any 
 Note that I am employing the regular notion of isomorphism of distributions of properties and relations, 16
not the notion of isomorphism of posets: viz. a 1-1 monotone function f from ↓e to ↓f.  That also yields a 
notion of equivalence between states and an associated notion of commensurateness. Fortunately given 
the general argument I don’t have to consider every plausible candidate.
proper substructure of ⊕E∪P that suffices for D, but is not structurally identical to ⊕E, will 
be too large to be commensurate with D. The structure of ⊕E is the smallest 
substructure of ⊕E∪P that suffices for D. This suggests that we cash out the idea of 
commensurateness using the concepts of structure and substructure.! !
! Let’s use r≅s to abbreviate: r and s have the same structure. We can define the 
notion structural commensurateness (or s-commensurate) thus:!
s is structurally commensurate with P iff s suffices for P and for any r⊑s that 
suffices for P, r≅s.!
Note that this is formally parallel to minimal sufficer.  Strict identity (=) and structural 
identity(≅) are both equivalence relations on states.  Structural identity is a weaker!
equivalence relation than strict identity, so more states are s-commensurate with a 
proposition than are minimal sufficers for it. It is the structure of s which has to be 
minimal relative to P for s for to be commensurate with P.  !
! The core notion of commensurateness then is this: a sufficer s is commensurate 
with P just in case any part of s that suffices for P is equivalent to (hence no smaller 
than in the salient sense) s itself.  A proper part of a state can be as large as the whole, 
a whole may be no larger than some of its proper parts. The part-whole relation is not 
the only relevant relation of relative size.!
!  Since ⊕E suffices for D, and all the proper parts of ⊕E that suffice for D are 
structurally equivalent to ⊕E, ⊕E is an s-commensurate sufficer for D. While ⊕E∪P 
suffices for D not all the proper parts of ⊕E∪P that suffice for D are structurally 
equivalent to ⊕E∪P.!
6! Not all propositions have structurally minimal sufficers.!
Are there cases in which a state is clearly an s-commensurate sufficer for a certain 
proposition P (it contains neither too little nor too much) but, intuitively, it isn’t 
commensurate with P?  There are, and while it takes a little work to show it, the 
counterexample bears some similarity to Restall’s counterexample to minimality, as I 
have laid it out. !
! Let us say that an n-cluster is the fusion of a set of electron states, consisting of 
exactly n electrons, in which each electron bears some basic equivalence relation W 
(being with, say) to every member of the set, and to nothing outside the set; and nothing 
outside the set bears W to any member of the set. ! !
! A fusion of m-clusters, exactly one for every n>m, is said to be uniformly clustered 
above m. !
! Suppose there are denumerably infinitely many electrons, each electron comes 
in an m-cluster, and that there is just exactly one m-cluster for every m.  The fusion of 
these clusters is uniformly clustered above 0. Let C0 be the smallest set of actual basic 
states such that ⊕C0 is uniformly clustered above 0.  Let Cn+1⊂Cn be the largest subset of Cn that excludes just the basic states in the smallest cluster in Cn.  ⊕Cn+1 arises from ⊕Cn by lopping off the n-cluster from ⊕Cn.  So for all n, ⊕Cn is clustered above n.!
! We now have a descending chain of less and less determinate states: !⊕C0 ⊐ ⊕C1 ⊐ ⊕C2 ⊐ ...  ⊕Cn ⊐ ⊕Cn+1 ⊐ ...    !
where the structure of ⊕Cn+1 is a proper substructure of ⊕Cn. !
! Consider the proposition:!
Bn:  ! Some state uniformly clustered above n is actual!
⊕Cn is a minimal sufficer for Bn and seems (intuitively) to be commensurate with Bn. !
! Let B be the existential generalization of Bn: (∃n)Bn.  That is:!
B! There is an n such that some state uniformly clustered above n is actual.!
!
For every n, Bn entails B, so for every n, ⊕Cn suffices for all the consequences of Bn, like 
B.  So, for each n, ⊕Cn suffices for B.   Given this, ⊕Cn is commensurate with B if and 
only if it is not too large for B.  Is ⊕Cn too large for B? !
! If, for some n, ⊕Cn is too large for B, then everything of which ⊕Cn is a proper part 
is also too large for B. i.e. everything larger than ⊕Cn. (In particular, every state from ⊕C0 
to ⊕Cn-1 is too large for C.) If for some n, ⊕Cn isn’t too large for B then every proper part 
of ⊕Cn that also suffices for B isn’t too large for B. (In particular, every state ⊕Cn+m is 
commensurate with B.)!
! Suppose some members of the chain are too large and some are not.  Then 
there must be an n such that ⊕Cn is too large for B, while ⊕Cn+1 is not too large.  If so, 
there is some finite initial segment of the chain — ⊕C0 ⊐ ⊕C1 ⊐ ⊕C2 ⊐ ...  ⊕Cn  —all 
members of which are too large for B, and this is followed by an infinite descending 
chain ⊕Cn+1 ⊐ ⊕Cn+2 ⊐ ..., all members of which are exactly the right size for B. !
! This is implausible.  What could make the difference between ⊕Cn (too large), 
and ⊕Cn+1 (just right).  If ⊕Cn+1 isn’t too large for B then adding the one small n-cluster to 
its infinite stock of much larger n-clusters isn’t either.  So if any state in the chain ⊕C0 ⊐ 
⊕C1 ⊐ ⊕C2 ⊐ ..... is commensurate with B, then every state in the chain is commensurate 
with B.  So either every state in the sequence ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3 ... is a commensurate 
sufficer for B or B has no commensurate sufficers.  So if B is to have any 
commensurate sufficers at all, all of the members of the sequence ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3, ... 
must be commensurate sufficers.!
! No state in the sequence ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3 ... is structurally commensurate with B. 
For suppose that for some n, ⊕Cn  is an s-commensurate sufficer for B.  ⊕Cn+1 also 
suffices for B but is not structurally identical to ⊕Cn.  ⊕Cn+1 is a proper substructure of the 
the structure of ⊕Cn.  Since ⊕Cn is not an s-commensurate sufficer for B, no member of 
the sequence  ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3 ...  is s-commensurate with B.  So if we are going to have 
commensurate sufficers for all propositions we need a different notion.!
! Just as it is implausible that no member of the chain ⊕E0, ⊕E1, ⊕E2, ⊕E3 ... is a 
commensurate sufficer for D (rather, they all are) so too it is implausible that no member 
of the ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3 ... is a commensurate sufficer for B.  It is much more plausible that 
they all are.  So what we need is a concept of equivalence which deems all members of 
the sequence  ⊕C1, ⊕C2, ⊕C3 ... commensurate sufficers for B. Since none of these is 
structurally identical to any of the others, we need some other equivalence relation (or 
of relative size) on states.!
! This suggests moving to some notion of equivalence logically weaker than 
structural identity.  Consider equinumerosity. States r and s are equinumerous (r≃s) if 
they have the same sheer number of parts i.e. there is a one-to-one mapping from the 
set of parts of r to the set of parts of s.  And s is an numerically commensurate sufficer 
for P only if no part of s that suffices for is smaller than s. That is, any part of s that 
suffices for P is equinumerous with e.  !
! s is n-commensurate with P iff s suffices for P, and for any r⊑s that suffices 
for P, r≃s.!
Equinumerosity is a weaker equivalence relation than either identity or structural 
identity, this numerical commensurateness allows more states to be commensurate with 
a proposition than the previous two accounts. All the ⊕Εn are n-commensurate with D, 
and all the ⊕Cn are n-commensurate with B. !
! But while the first two accounts are too strong, ruling out clearly commensurate 
sufficers, this third account is too weak, ruling in sufficers that are way too large.  For 
example, since ⊕E∪P and ⊕E are equinumerous all the proper parts of ⊕(E∪P) that 
suffice for D are numerically commensurate with ⊕(E∪P).  But ⊕(E∪P) is clearly too 
large to be commensurate with the proposition D.  !
! There are of course infinitely many possible equivalence relations and associated 
notions of commensurateness, so a potted critique of candidates doesn’t constitute an 
impossibility proof.  !
7! The argument pattern generalized!
Whether or not we require unrestricted truthmaker maximalism, two basic desiderata for 
any adequate theory of truthmakers are: !
Restricted Truthmaker Maximalism: !
Every true contingent proposition has at least one truthmaker,!
Commensurateness: !
Any truthmaker for a proposition must be commensurate with that proposition.!
And, for there to be an adequate notion of commensurateness there must be an 
associated relation of equivalence on states (label it ≈) satisfying the equivalence 
schema:!
Equivalence Schema!
s is commensurate with P iff s suffices for P, and for any r⊑s that suffices for P, 
r≈s.  !
This simply spells out the idea that, for s to be commensurate with P, s must be both 
large enough for P (i.e. suffice for it) but not too large (any parts of s that suffice for P 
must be no larger than s itself).  Since a state can never be larger than a whole of which 
it is a part, it follows that all parts of s that suffice for P must be equivalent to s.  !
! If all propositions had minimal sufficers then these principles could be jointly 
satisfied, since minimal sufficers are clearly commensurate and we can capture it with 
the equivalence relation of strict state identity.  If, for example, the set of possible states 
were finite then all propositions would, ipso facto, have minimal sufficers. But as soon 
as the class of states is sufficiently interesting and the class of propositions sufficiently 
rich, then as Restall’s argument shows, there will be lots of propositions that do not 
have minimal sufficers.  In sufficiently rich frameworks such propositions are by no 
means rare or unusual.  So on the minimalist criterion for commensurateness, some 
propositions lack truthmakers.  But it we switch to a conception of commensurateness 
to allow in the states that are intuitively commensurate with the problematic propositions 
at hand, we end up counting as commensurate states that are not.   So is there any 
notion of commensurateness that gets everything right?!
! Firstly, I distill the common feature of the problematic states, and the propositions 
associated with them, that seems to generate the counterexamples to each notion of 
commensurateness.  I will show that if the classes of states and propositions are rich 
and interesting enough to contain what I will call large states and large propositions the 
requirement of commensurateness collapses into all-inclusiveness.  !
! First we need the ancillary notion of the largeness of a state which plays an 
important role the counterexamples above.  First a state s is infinite if it generates the 
now familiar infinitely descending chain: s ⊐	  s0 ⊐ s1  ... ⊐ sn  ⊐ ... .  Call the infinite chains 
that emanate from a state s the downward chains of s (for short).  Obviously a state that 
spouts one downward chain spouts infinitely many downward chains, and every 
member of such a downward chain is itself an infinite state.  Being infinite is a 
necessary but not quite a sufficient condition for a state to count as large.  Let Is be the 
set of infinite parts of s. A state f is strictly below state s if f is below every state in Is.  
(That is, f is a lower bound on Is, or f is a part of every member of Is.) The extra element 
to s’s being large is that no state strictly below s guarantees that some or other infinite 
part of s occurs. Intuitively, the state s is large provided it and all its infinite parts are 
“beyond the reach” of all the states that are strictly below it.!
! First we define what it is for s to be within reach of a state below it.  For this, we 
need a familiar concept from the theory of partial orders. ↑S,or the upset of S, is the set 
of all states that are above, or determine, some member of S.  (And ↑s is short for ↑{s}, 
the upset of the singleton of s, the set of all states that determine s, or of which s is a 
part.)  ↑f ⊆↑S  if and only if the obtaining of f  ensures that some member or other of S 
obtains.  !
! Proof: Suppose	  ↑f ⊆↑S. Since f∈↑f , f∈↑S.  So f determines some particular 
member of S and hence ensures that some member or other of S obtains. 
Suppose ↑f⊈↑S.	   Let h be an element of ↑f not in↑S.  Since h∈↑f, f⊑h.  Let s be 
some arbitrary member of S. If s⊑h then h∈↑S: contradiction.  Hence no member 
s of S is a part of h. If h  obtains then f obtains but no member of S obtains. So 
the obtaining of f doesn’t guarantee the obtaining of some member or other of S. !
!
We say that s is within reach of f if and only if f guarantees the occurrence of some or 
other infinite part of s: i.e.  ↑f ⊆↑Is.  And s is beyond the reach of a state f below s if and 




! A state s is large if and only if s is infinite and s is beyond the reach of every state 
f that is strictly below s (i.e. ↑f ⊈↑Is). !
!
! Of course, this notion of largeness is very coarse-grained.  But we do not need it 
to be any finer-grained for our purposes.  In fact its coarseness is a bonus.  With the 
notion of a large state we can now characterize large propositions.!
!
! Large propositions!
A proposition is large if and only if all its sufficers are large. !
  ! The proposition D (that there are denumerably many electrons) and the 
proposition B (that for some n, an n-cluster is actual) are both clearly large.  I will show 
this for D.  !
!
Proof Any state that suffices for D will be the fusion of some infinite set of 
electron states, E say.   ⊕E	  is infinite, and I⊕E is the set of fusions of infinite 17
subsets of E. For any two subsets S and T of E,	  f  is below both ⊕S and ⊕T iff f  
is below ⊕(S∩T). Let  E1	  and	  E2	  	  be two infinite subsets of E such that E1∪E2=E	  	  
and	  E1∩E2=∅.	  ⊕E1 and	  ⊕E2	  are both in I⊕E. So any state strictly below s must 
be below	  ⊕∅ i.e. below the null state 0. But there is only one such state, the null 
state itself.  Since ↑0 is the set of all states and ↑Is isn’t, ↑0⊈↑Is.      !
! !
(That B is large is an exercise for the reader.)  !
! If there are large elements in the space of possible states Ω, then there will be 
many such, and any sufficiently rich propositional framework designed for such a space 
will itself contain a rich set of large propositions.  !
! !!It follows immediately that:!
 Strictly speaking we would need to specify the space of events with basic events consisting in states 17
like X’s being an electron.  I am ruling out weird spaces in which there is a basic property D of fusions of 
particulars  that consists in that particular being a scattered denumerable infinity of electrons.
(i) s is large iff every infinite part of s (i.e. every member of Is) is large.!
Proof: Suppose s is large and r∈Is, r≠s. For every state f strictly smaller than s, 
↑f⊈↑Is.  f is strictly below s iff f is below every member of Is. Since Ir⊆Is f is also 
strictly below r, and for ever y state f strictly smaller than r, ↑f⊈↑Ir.  So r is large. 
Suppose that for every r, if r∈Is then r is large. Since s∈Is it follows that s is large.!
! !
! Let	  Ω	  be the set of possible states, ΩLarge the subset of large states in Ω, and let s 
be any member of ΩLarge.  Consider the following proposition:!
Ls! Some large part of s occurs.!
Clearly all the members of Is — all and only the large parts of s  — suffice for Ls. If any 
of them obtains Ls is true. So Ls  looks like it might be a large proposition.  We show that 
it is.!
!
(ii) Ls is a large proposition.!
!
Proof: Suppose r suffices for Ls  and r∉Is. Either there is some member i of Is that 
r determines or there isn’t. Suppose the former. r determines i ∈ Is.  Since i is 
large, for every f strictly below i, ↑f ⊈↑Ii.  Since r⊐i, every state strictly below r is 
also t is large.  Suppose t does not determine any large part of s. If t is below  
(see **).  Suppose t is large part of Ls  then t is not a member of any  any of i’s 
descending chains.   any sufficer for Ls has to determine the occurrence of a 
large part of s, any sufficer for Ls also has to be large (from (i)). So Ls is a large 
proposition. Since every sufficer for Ls contains some large part of s as a proper 
part, every commensurate sufficer for Ls must contain some large part of s as a 
proper part (provided there are commensurate sufficers for Li).  !
! !
! From an intuitive point of view it seems that here, as in the earlier cases, either 
all the large parts of s  are not too large for Ls  or all of them are too large.  Demanding 
that there be a precise point below s in each descending chain that s sprouts, at which 
point we flip from too large to just right just seems gratuitous. (The following is intended 
to spell this out although I am not sure it makes it any plainer or more obvious.)!
!   Suppose some large parts of s commensurate with Ls  but not all are 
commensurate with Ls.  Then there will be non-denumerably many chains that end up in 
the non-commensurate regions of s.   Where  s = c0, let c0 ⊐ c1 ⊐ c 2 ⊐ ...  cn  ⊐	  ...  be 
one such chain.  If cn  is commensurate with Ls then cn isn’t too large, so all the 
elements of the chain below cn will also be commensurate with Ls. If cn  is not 
commensurate with Ls then cn is too large, and all the elements of the chain above cn 
will also be incommensurate with Ls.  So in each such descending chain there will be a 
cut off — cn+1 will be exactly the right size while its predecessor in the chain, cn, will be 
too large. So an initial finite section of the chain c0 ⊐ c1 ⊐ c 2 ⊐ ...  cn  will consist of 
states that are all too large for Ls, and an infinite final section cn+1 ⊐ cn+2 ⊐ ...  cn+m ...will 
consist of members that are exactly the right size for Ls.   But nothing in the structure of 
states or their relative sizes seems to justify the change from too large to exactly right at 
precisely that point cn+1 below s.  That there have to be such cutoff points in each such 
chain seems as implausible here as in the earlier cases.!
! So in each chain either all the states in the chain will be too large for L or none of 
the states in the chain are too large for Ls.  And from that it follows that either all large 
parts of s are commensurate with Ls or none of the large parts of L are commensurate 
with L.!
! If none of the large parts of Ls are commensurate with Ls then (since any sufficer 
for Ls has to contain such a part) Ls would have no commensurate sufficers, and hence 
no truthmakers in any world.  So on pain of jettisoning the truthmaker program, all the 
large parts of s have to be commensurate with Ls.  Given the schema for 
commensurateness that entails:!
! If d is any large part of s then d≈s.!
Since there was nothing special about the state s and the associated proposition Ls, 
we have effectively proved:!
(ii) Every large state is equivalent to (i.e. no larger than) all its large parts.!
Suppose that s and j are any two distinct but compatible large states. Then i⊕j exists, a 
state of which both s and j are parts.  Since i⊕j has large parts, i⊕j is itself large.  By (ii) 
i⊕j is equivalent to all its large parts, so in particular i⊕j ≈ s and  i⊕j ≈ j.  By transitivity 
of equivalence we have i≈j.  That is:!
(iii) Any two large compatible states are equivalent.!
Suppose that P is any large proposition, and let s be a sufficer for P.  Since P is large, s 
is large. By (iii), s is equivalent to all of its large parts. So s suffices for P and any part r 
of s that suffices for P is also large. Since r and s are compatible large states, by (iii) we 
have that r≈s. So any part r of s that suffices for P is equivalent to s.  And that, of 
course, entails:!
!  s is commensurate with P.  !
But there was nothing special about P and s. So:!
(iv) If P is any large proposition, every sufficer for P is commensurate with P.!
For a large proposition every state large enough to ensure its truth is also exactly the 
right size.  A State is thus a truthmaker for a large proposition if and only if it is an actual 
sufficer.  Thus if the state space contains large states, then for the class of large 
propositions the truthmaker theorist is in a pickle: she is either forced to abandon the 
requirement for truthmakers for a whole class of propositions or else forced to embrace 
all actual sufficers of those propositions as genuine truthmakers.  The assumption that 
all propositions have genuinely commensurate sufficers thus appears to be 
unsustainable.!
